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Introduction 
On 1, 1977, California began a major reform in its policy 
dealing with prison sentences. The Uniform Determinate Sentence Law (to 
be referred to here as the DSL) became effective on this day, replacing 
a system of indeterminate sentencing (to be called here ISL) that had 
been in existence for sixty years. Long a "leader" in penal reform, 
California was one of the early adopters of indeterminate sentencing and 
its concomitant, the rehabilitative or medical model of imprisonment, 
when this wave of reform swept the nation in the first decades of the 
20th Century. Moreover, California's indeterminate sentence policy carried 
the medical model close to its logical extremes, sentencing most prisoners 
for terms with a maximum of life. Just as California had been a pioneer 
in the indeterminate sentence reform movement, so too with the current 
wave of reform many states back from indeterminate to determinate 
sentencing laws. The DSL introduced many important changes in California 
sentencing practice: the judge imposing sentence in a prison case was 
required to select a specific term in years from among an apparently 
limited set of possibilities specified by the legislature; the discretion 
of the parole board (called the Adult Authority under the ISL) to deter-
mine actual release dates for prisoners was effectively eliminated; new 
and strict rul making it difficult to soners from earning 
and keeping their time off for good behavior were imposed; and, finally, 
the system parole supervision after release and the ssibili of 
recommitment the inal term as a pena for parol vio ation were 
virtual 
2 
The new DSL thus radically changed the process under which prison 
term lengths were set (shifting the locus of influence from the parole 
board to decisions made by the judge and prosecutor in the context of 
case disposition and sentencing) and, it was hoped, might improve the 
quality of life in prison by removing some of the extraordinary uncer-
tainty characterizing the open-ended sentences of the ISL. The passage 
of the law itself was the product of extended legislative debate and of 
a coalition built of law enforcement interests as well as due process 
liberals and prisoner support groups. The effects of the law upon such 
things as numbers of people sentenced to prison and length of terms served 
were the subject of much debate and conjecture during the legislative de-
bate and many conflicting expectations were generated. The administration 
of the new law has been the subject of much discussion in California and 
further legislative activity. Indeed, a major change in the original DSL 
was passed by the legislature during the nine-month period between its 
initial passage (in September 1976) and its effective date (July 1977). 
Since then numerous bills have been passed increasing the length of terms 
and mandating prison sentences in various types of cases. 
The California experience has been the subject of keen attention 
in other states, many of which are considering determinate sentence legis-
lation themselves. The same concerns and interests that produced reform 
in California are at work in other places as well, and increased deter-
minancy in sentencing appears to be a reform whose time has come. It 
is clearly early to begin the process of attempting to assess the effects 
of the California Determinate Sentence Law, for only a few years have 
passed since it went into effect and its ultimate impacts may take years 
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to be fully worked out. Moreover, the law has changed rapidly, and in some 
ways it is hard to decide what the Determinate Sentence Law is or was, 
for its current form differs in significant respects from the law which 
went into effect in 1977 (e.g., the terms for many crimes are substan-
tially longer). By the same token, though, because of the importance of 
the issue of determinate sentence reform, the salience of the California 
experience, and the fact that other states are currently wrestling with 
what to do about the same issues that are at play in California, some pre-
liminary research and discussion seemed useful, tentative though our con-
clusions might be. 
Our focus is upon a particular aspect of the impact of the DSL, its 
effects upon decisions made in criminal courts. Thus, we examine the im-
pact of the law in three California counties (San Bernardino, San Francisco, 
Santa Clara) and, in particular, its integration into the courtroom work-
group culture that exists in these (and all) jurisdictions. How has the 
law affected the process by which sentences are decided upon in the three 
counties, particularly decisions about whether to send convicted defen-
dants to prison? Has the law caused, as many said it would, an increase 
in the proportion of defendants sent to prison? If so, how has this re-
sult come about? Has the law had any impact upon the process by which 
defendants are induced to plead guilty? Has it increased the rate of 
guilty pleas or their timing? How have the law's provisions dealing with 
probation eligibility and length of terms been integrated into the nego-
tiation process which is at the centerpiece of most criminal courts? Have 
its provisions become chips in the bargaining process? Has the new law 
affected influence patterns in the bargaining process? Has the new law 
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altered influence patterns in the bargaining process, giving more power 
to the prosecutor or judge? These are the kinds of questions that were 
the subject of expectations at the time the law was passed, as well as 
assertions since, and upon which we focus here. One major issue we do 
not deal with in any detail is that of the effects of the law on length 
of sentences. Because under the old law sentence length was determined 
by a state agency--the Adult Authority--the appropriate unit of analysis 
for assessing the impact of the law on the length of terms is the state, 
not the county. Because of our focus upon decisions at the county level, 
then, we do not have the appropriate data for detailed discussion of the 
length of term issue. 
In addition to providing information about how the new law has 
affected and been mediated by court disposition processes, we also are 
concerned with a somewhat broader issue, that of the impact or implementa-
tion process in general. How does the impact of California DSL inform us 
about the general process by which public policy is made at the legisla-
tive level and then translated into behavioral changes by other decision 
makers (bureaucrats, courtroom personnel, etc.) whose job it is to "imple-
ment" the policies of the legislature? How, in this case, does implementa-
tion of the DSL illuminate the process by which sentencing policy is made, 
implemented, and modified as time goes by? 
Formal Provisions of the DSL 
The DSL was in some respects quite limited in its potential impact 
on court sentencing practices, and in others quite sweeping. It was 
limited in that it placed relatively few constraints upon the decision 
about whether to send a defendant to prison--it said nothing about 
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sentences for misdemeanors, and had only a couple of provisions which 
attempted to disqualify certain types of defendants from receiving pro-
bated sentences (e.g., those who committed great bodily injury on vul-
nerable victims or those with certain specified current and prior violent 
offenses). The DSL affected most directly the decision about sentence 
length for those receiving prison terms. Before turning to the formal 
provisions dealing with sentence length, though, it is worth observing 
that many participants in the observers of the process which lead to 
passage of the DSL were of the view that the law would cause larger num-
bers of defendants to be sentenced to prison. What we have called the 
"informal effects hypothesis" suggested that under the old ISL judges were 
reluctant to send "marginal" defendants to prison when terms were so open-
ended and appeared potentially so long. Thus, a second degree burglary 
was, under the ISL, to be sentenced to a term of one-to-fourteen years. 
In cases in which the defendant was on the borderline between a prison 
term and a long jail sentence, the open-ended nature of the ISL was 
often said to lead judges to select a local term. If prison terms were 
short and determinate, it was argued, judges would send more marginal 
defendants to prison. Thus, although its formal provisions did not dir-
ectly constrain the prison/no prison choice to any substantial degree, 
many of those supporting its passage were operating on the assumption that 
it would increase prison rates via this informal process. 
The law's provisions appear, on their surface, to be straightforward 
and simple. For each crime the legislature specified three possible pen-
alties. The most common were the choice between 16 months, two years, or 
three years; two, three, or four years; or three, four, or five years. 
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The middle term was the presumptive choice, unless the judge found the 
case to involve mitigating or aggravating circumstances. Thus, in a single 
count second degree burglary case, the judge first retained the option to 
sentence a defendant to a term of probation, perhaps with a jail sentence 
as a condition of the imposition of probation. Should the judge decide 
on a prison sentence, the term was to be either sixteen months, two years, 
or three years. In a strong arm robbery, by the same token, the judge 
could either impose probation or a term of either two, three, or four 
years. 
The relative simplicity of the above examples in fact covers over 
a good deal more complexity and discretion in many cases. In cases with 
multiple counts, the judge must decide whether terms are to be served 
consecutively or concurrently. In a "simple" burglary case involving 
four counts of second degree burglary, the possible terms which may be im-
posed range from sixteen months to five years, and include, at a rough 
count, a total of eight possible sentences, depending upon how decisions 
about stacking terms are made. 
In addition, the legislature provided that sentences for defendants 
might be "enhanced' 1--that is, increased--if they engaged in certain forms 
of behavior (e.g., carried a weapon, used a gun, inflicted great bodily 
harm) or had especially serious prior records. Such terms could be im-
posed or stayed if the enhancement was plead and proved. 
As a result of these changes, the new law effectively turned over 
control of the sentencing process to courtroom participants--prosecutors 
via their control over charges (counts and enhancements) and judges via 
their selection of particular sentences. The opportunities for sentence 
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bargaining were greatly increased. Under the ISL, the judge simply sen-
tenced the defendant to the term prescribed by law and the Adult 
Authority set the actual release date. There was substantial negotia-
tion under the ISL about charges and sentences, but it was of somewhat 
ritualistic character. The prosecutor might agree to drop counts in 
return for a plea, but these were "silent beefs"--charges of which the 
defendant was not convicted but which survived to influence Adult Authority 
release decisions. Moreover, although a judge might agree to sentence 
concurrently rather than consecutively, the Adult Authority retained such 
substantial influence over release dates that these decisions, like charge 
bargains, served more to make the plea acceptable to the defendant than to 
" 
constrain greatly the actual sentence to be served. 
Finally, the law established good time provisions which permitted 
a defendant to earn up to a third off the sentence imposed for obedience 
to prison rules and participation in various programs. A prisoner's good 
time was vested each year, and relatively elaborate procedural protections 
circumscribed the process by which good time might be taken away in any 
given year. As a result, at the time of sentencing defendants could know 
with relative assurance what their maximum terms and actual release dates 
were likely to be. 
As noted above, the combination of impositions of actual terms, rules 
for consecutive and concurrent terms, the choice of staying or imposing 
terms for enhancements and statutory good time mean that under the DSL 
there is a great opportunity for charge and sentence bargaining. Influ-
ence over length of term was largely moved from the Adult Authority to the 
courtroom disposition process. The parole function was virtually eliminated, 
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both as to release dates and the abil to recommit a released prisoner 
for a parole violation. In terms of courtroom dynamics, the ecu-
tion's offer as well as the defendant's maximum exposure if the deal is 
turned down and a conviction at t ial resulted can be se specified 
during plea bargaining. 
The effects of the new law on length of prison terms were difficult 
to predict. The middle terms were selected because they approximated 
median time served under the ISL. Thus, in simple one count cases, the 
third off for good time might be expected to decrease term length on 
average. On the other hand, median time served under the ISL included 
time informally added by the Adult Authority for various case attributes 
(e.g., violence, use of weapons, prior record, etc.) that were now to be 
added to the principal term as enhancements. From s perspective, in 
cases which involved enhancements one might on average some increase 
in term length. A final confounding factor is the ibil -indeed ex-
perience has already shown it to be better characterized as a propensity--
that the legislature might increase term length under the DSL. It has 
repeatedly done so, making both comparison with past practice and predic-
tions about the future difficult. 
In sum, the formal provisions of the law dealt on with defendants 
who were sentenced to prison, though most believed that an e in 
prison commitment rates would result from the move to determinate sentencing. 
Although the terms available appeared to be quite circumscribed for each 
offense, decisions about concurrent versus consecutive sentencing and 
about the imposition of terms for enhancements meant that judges, prose-
cutors, defense attorneys and defendants had both increased resources and 
incentives to bargain over pleas in prison cases. 
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A Note on Data Sources 
Before turning to the presentation of our findings, a brief word 
about the sources of our data is in order. We utilize both qualitative 
and quantitative data in our discussion of the impact of the law in the 
three counties. The qualitative data consist of interviews with court-
room participants and direct observation of plea bargaining discussions. 
We interviewed 26 experienced judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys 
in the three cities, asking their perceptions of the purposes and effects 
of the new law. In addition to interviewing, we spent approximately 3-4 
months in each jurisdiction following participants around, observing pre-
trial conferences and less formal plea bargaining sessions, and attempting 
to find out what was going on in each, and how current patterns contrasted 
with those under the ISL. We observed on the order of 75-150 pre-trial 
conferences in each city, and prepared transcripts of what was said in 
40-50 for each city. 
Two sources of quantitative data were used. The California Bureau 
of Criminal Statistics (BCS) provided us with data tapes for all cases in 
the three counties during the years 1974-1978 (1977 data were missing for 
Santa Clara County). BCS data include most serious charge, defendant 
characteristics like race, sex, past record, as well as mode of disposi-
tion and sentence imposed. We focus in our analysis mainly upon two common 
arrest charges--robbery and burglary--and upon cases disposed of in 
Superior Court. Unless otherwise noted, all the data discussed here come 
from the BCS tapes. The other source of data was a small effort we mounted 
ourselves. We gathered information from Superior Court files on burglary 
and robbery cases in two twelve-month periods (calendar 1976 and July 1, 
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1979-June 30, 1979), focusing upon seriousness of arrest and disposition 
charges, as well as allegation and disposition of enhancement and proba-
tion disqualifiers. We gathered such data on the universe of Superior 
Court cases during the pre- and post-law periods in which robbery was 
the most serious charge and a 50 percent sample of burglary cases. 
The Three Cities 
Because the focus of this research is upon the process by which the 
DSL was implemented at the local level, we chose three cities which were 
different in a variety of respects. Our field work and data analysis 
looks at the implementation of the law in San Franciscol Santa Clara, and 
San Bernardino counties. They varied in several ways, including the nature 
of plea bargaining under the ISL, patterns of influence in the plea 
bargaining process, and general levels of harshness in sentencing. 
San Francisco best fits the common image of a crowded urban court. 
In the Superior Court there is great emphasis upon keeping the docket mov-
ing and worry about the development of a backlog of unresolved cases. 
The mechanism developed for dealing with these perceived needs, dating 
from the early 1970s, is a form of judge-dominated sentence bargaining. 
Nearly all cases have a formally scheduled pre-trial conference--the bulk 
presided over by the Master Calendar Judge--at which plea bargains are 
discussed and typically agreed to. Relatively little bargaining between 
defense attorney and prosecutor takes place before the pre-trial conference, 
largely because of the dominant influence of the judge. The pre-trial 
conferences do not really look like bargaining; rather, they are very 
rapid presentations to the judge of issues each side believes are impor-
tant (seriousness of crime and past record, factual disputes, quality of 
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of evidence) followed by an announcement by the judge of a proposed sen-
tence. The sentence is typically a specific number of months in jail or 
prison, though occasionally it will involve a range (for example, the 
judge may specify that a sentence in county jail will be between six 
and nine months, depending upon the recommendation contained in the pre-
sentence report). There is little in the way of negotiation or haggling 
in the sense that possible sentences are presented, argued about, revised, 
and agreement gradually zeroes in on a final '~argain.'' Rather the judge 
listens, questions, comments, and finally announces a figure, and this 
sentence is usually not changed as a result of further discussion. The 
prosecutor's control over charges seems of limited significance in San 
Francisco--unlike the other cities--because of norms of deference to the 
judge. Thus, the judge routinely exercises his authority to sentence con-
currently or consecutively and to stay time on enhancements, all in ser-
vice of reaching the number that he has decided is appropriate. Perhaps 
most telling, in San Francisco judges hardly ever., in our observation, 
asked the prosecutor to drop allegations that rendered defendants presump-
tively or mandatorily ineligible for probation (e.g., those with two prior 
felonies). Rather, if a defendant who was ineligible was to be the sub-
ject or a probated sentence, the judge simply assumed that the prosecutor 
would drop whatever charges were required in order to render the defendant 
technically eligible for the sentence the judge wished to impose. Under 
the ISL, San Francisco had routinely engaged in sentence bargaining in 
jail cases, though of course their ability to do in prison cases was 
greatly constrained by the nature of the sentence structure. In terms of 
sentence severity, San Francisco was slightly below average for the state 
during the years prior to implementation of the DSL. 
12 
Santa Clara differed from San Francisco in a variety of respects, 
though their overall level of harsnhess (as measured by rate of prison 
commitments among those convicted in Superior Court) was only marginally 
higher than San Francisco's. If San Francisco looks much like the common 
image of an over-crowded bureaucratic court system, Santa Clara is closer 
to the ideal ty~e of a more professionally-oriented, legalistic system. 
The dominant figure in the disposition process in Santa Clara was the 
district attorney rather than the judge. Judges were much more deferent 
to prosecutors' decisions, less willing to become involved in sentence bar-
gaining (though it surely was not unknown), and in general fit better the 
more ''professional" role of an arbiter above the hurly-burly of plea 
bargaining. The predominant type of bargaining in Santa Clara was a form 
of modified sentence bargaining, called the conditional plea or no-state-
prison bargain. The prosecuting attorney and defense attorney would come 
to an agreement over charges and the prosecutor would agree that the 
defendant should receive a local jail sentence. If the judge who ulti-
mately sentenced the defendant (Santa Clara used a Master Sentence Calendar 
system, as did the others) decided to impose a prison term, the defendant 
was entitled to withdraw the plea. In conditional plea cases, the bargain 
was usually open as to sentence, with the ultimate constraint that the term 
was very likely to exceed twelve months and would be served locally. In 
prison cases there was sentence bargaining, but the judge was substantially 
less active and dominant than in San Francisco. 
In San Francisco, if the judge desired to impose a probated sen-
tence and the defendant was technically ineligible for probation, the 
prosecutor was assumed to be willing to drop whatever allegations stood 
in the way of the bargain. In Santa Clara, in similar cases, the judge 
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attempted to persuade the prosecutor to drop the allegations that pre-
vented probation f the ecutor refused, a no-state-prison bargain 
simply was not struck. Of course, were not indifferent to 
the suggestions of j , but they were free of presumption of the 
San Francisco system that whatever the judge wanted was to be accommodated 
by prosecutorial concessions. The system, thus, was one with a limited 
form of sentence bargaining, more judicial distance from the settlement 
process than characterized San Francisco, a more legalistic orientation 
(e.g., the importance of formal eligibility in the discussion decision 
about probation), and very strong prosecutorial influence. 
San Bernardino, a geographically enormous county lying to the east 
of Los Angeles, was the third research site. As with several other 
southern California counties, the levels of imprisonment were historically 
much higher in San Bernardino than in our northern counties. The San 
Bernardino court em lay somewhere between San Francisco and Santa 
Clara in terms of terms of influence in plea bargaining. More than either 
of the others, San Bernardino disposed of a substantial number of its 
felony cases an ear form of disposition called "certification." In 
about a third of felony ases, the defendant plead lty to a felony 
charge in Municipal Court on the 
and was then "certi ed" to 
of the scheduled preliminary hearing 
Court for sentence. Most of these 
are s and ' as to entence, and often involve serious 
cases (the rate of 
as the rate in cases 
few certifications 
10 of t 
onment in certification cases was about the same 
of via plea in Superior Court). In the 
San Franc co cally are used in fewer than 
es in the other two counties), the both 
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covers charge and sentence and is cleared with the Master Calendar Judge 
in Superior Court prior to entry of the plea in Municipal Court. In 
San Bernardino such clearances are not common, and thus the Superior Court 
judges do not participate in plea negotiation in a substantial fraction 
of the cases they ultimately sentence. In cases which do come up to 
Superior Court for disposition, the judge plays a facilitative role, 
evaluating the arguments of each side, offering comments, and ultimately 
suggesting a sentence (or a range to be refined by a pre-sentence report). 
Although the judge seems more inclined to exercise influence over the 
prosecutor than in Santa Clara, there is much less dominance than in San 
Francisco. The feature that seems most to distinguish San Bernardino is 
a sense of shared expectations about the judge and a generally more relaxed 
atmosphere. Things are less hurried there, and a single judge presides 
over all Superior Court pre-trial conferences and does all of the sen-
tencing (with the exception of cases resulting from conviction at trial). 
Because a single judge does so much, deals are worked out without direct 
judicial participation that would not occur in San Francisco. The certi-
fication procedure seems an example of anticipated reactions--the case is 
settled early without judicial participation but with strong expectations 
about what the judge in Superior Court is likely to do. The generally con-
sensual character of the system--agreement not so much on what ought to be 
done but on what is likely to be done--appears to be the linch-pin for the 
San Bernardino system, and to permit rapid case disposition without the 
detailed agreements that characterize San Francisco. 
In sum, then, the three cities have somewhat differing styles of 
plea bargaining, emphasis upon and concern for legal formalities, and 
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influence patterns. It was these different environments into which the 
DSL entered and which mediated its implementation. Our general finding 
is that in terms of the most discussed and important dependent variable--
rates of prison commitment--the law's impact was similar across the three 
jurisdictions. The best predictor of what happened after passage of the 
DSL was what had been happening before it. The differing styles of plea 
bargaining do not appear, on the basis of our limited observation at least, 
to have had important effects upon alterations in decisions about impri-
sonment. 
Office Policies, Rules, and Other Formal Responses 
The first stage of response to the passage of an innovation like the 
DSL is the adoption of formal policies. These occurred both at the state 
and the local level. At the state level, the California Judicial Council 
followed its legislative mandate and promulgated rules about how the new 
law ought to be administered. It produced long lists of things to be 
taken into account in making such choices as probation v. prison, consecu-
tive v. concurrent terms, how to handle enhancements and the like. The 
approach of the Judicial Council was so broad and general as to be of 
little guidance to (or constraint upon) courtroom participants. Their 
lists of criteria to be considered were sufficiently inclusive that they 
encompassed nearly everything that anyone thinking about sentencing might 
conceive of, thus providing little guidance and much in the way of avail-
able "reasons" for sentence choices made the basis of existing practice. 
Thus, in San.Francisco the standard reason given for acceptance of a 
guilty plea and imposition of a less than maximum possible sentence was 
"early admission of guilt," even though the admission took place only a 
week or so prior to the formal trial date. 
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More t for our purposes were the decisions made by district 
at about what to do about probation ifiers and enhancements. 
These sions gave resources to the , for dropping 
of an all ion of probation ineli li or an enhancement potentially 
had important consequences for the ultimate sentence that was likely to 
be ed. of an all ion that a defendant had committed 
ury meant that a possible three-year term was avoided 
(the judge could stay time on an enhancement and thus a prosecutor's re-
fusal to it did not guarantee the term would be imposed; but dropping 
it did the possibility that a judge might impose it if he or she 
were so incl In all three cities the ecutor adopted formal 
policies that seemed to approximate "full " That is, they 
announced that all ion di ifiers and enhancements would be filed 
at the out and simply 
for 1 e ions should 
only be done if the state of the evidence changed--e.g., a gun turned out 
to be a uries thought to be s turned out to be minor, etc. 
As a result, formal terms at least one that enhancements 
or ion ifiers would not often be dropped after they had been 
all Yet even the formal policies had flexibility to per-
mit use of them as For example, one supervisory prose-
cutor from San Bernardino characterized a corr®on approach to enhancements: 
If is there and it's provable, it is to 
be general po is not to drop any en-
hancement unless there is some failure to prove. You get 
into situations, say we have enhancements for gun 
use, and sometimes your proof is going to rely upon the 
test of the victim who claims a gun was used, and 
you will be unable to ascertain whether it was a real gun 
or gun. We would charge the allegation normally. 
In a case like that, I would not be adverse to striking 
it if we could get a plea on the case. But if, in fact, 
a gun was recovered by the police at the time of arrest, 
and it was a real gun, then the policy is not to strike 
the enhancement ... If we feel, for instance, the mid-
range state prison term would be appropriate in a given 
case, we might give up the enhancement. You're dealing 
in terms of years and a specific period of confinement 
so it depends on each individual case. You have to look 
at it and see just how much time in custody do you want 
for the particular defendant, and if you can get that 
amount of time by striking an [enhancement], okay; if 
you can't get it, you're going to hold it. 
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Thus, if problems of proof developed with an enhancement it was generally 
thought that half a loaf was better than one and conviction and sen-
tencing on the underlying charge was more important than attempting to 
obtain a conviction at trial and imposition of an enhanced sentence. 
Since the trial deputies had control over information about the strength 
of the evidence, this meant that it was relatively easy to justify dropping 
of an enhancement for an organizationally acceptable reason (e.g., a wit-
ness who saw the gun had turned soft, or done poorly at the prel~minary 
hearing) when the need to induce a plea was in fact the more important 
reason. Sometimes such decisions were made to evade office policy; more 
often they were done with the tacit or explicit concurrence of organiza-
tional superiors. 
The probation disqualifiers and enhancements are, from one pers-
pective, promulgation of public policy asserting that defendants with 
certain attributes or who engage in certain types of behavior shall be 
punished in certain ways. From the point of view of courtroom workgroups 
which are accustomed to settling cases by negotiation, they are resources 
to be used in the bargaining process. In terms of formal office policy, 
the norm was one of full enforcement; yet recognition both of the 
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possibility that the state of evidence might change and the importance of 
conviction and sentence meant that even such full enforcement policies 
were open to use of these provisions in the disposition process. 
Prison Commitment Rates 
We have been able to discover no one who seemed to believe that the 
DSL would reduce the number of prison commitments, and most believed that 
it would cause an increase in the rate at which defendants were sent to 
state prison. This, indeed, was one of the major features of the reform 
that attracted the support of the law enforcement community. Three re-
lated factors associated with the move to determinate sentencing were 
typically suggested as reasons why prison rates would be likely to in-
crease: (1) the increased inclination of judges to send nmarginal" de-
fendants to prison if the terms were short and determinate; (2) the effects 
of the probation disqualifiers that were part of the bill itself (though 
they were of admittedly rather limited scope); (3) the general thrust of 
the legislation, with its renunciation of rehabilitation and emphasis on 
punishment might cause a general toughening of sentencing policy. 
Prison commitment rates in the years immediately following imple-
mentation of the DSL did increase in the state as a whole and in our three 
counties. Most observers, including many court personnel we interviewed, 
found, therefore, that their expectations had been fulfilled. Our own 
examination of the available data in the three counties makes us somewhat 
skeptical whether this conclusion is well supported. Prison commitment 
rates are subject to substantial variation over time. They may be tied 
to economic conditions and alterations in demographic characteristics 
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of the population, both of which may influence crime rates; changes in 
penalty structures (e.g., the move to decriminalize certain consensual 
crimes); prison capacities; changes in penal philosophy (e.g., the 
"community corrections" and "alternatives to incarceration" movements 
of the 1960s and 1970s); and changes in public attitudes toward senten-
cing practices. These and other factors produce both secular trends and 
short-term fluctuations in prison commitment rates. There are great diffi-
culties in sorting out all the potential effects of any particular innova-
tion from rival causal factors, and thus attributing changes to it. In 
the case of the DSL in our three counties, examination of long-term and 
short-term trends in prison commitment rates suggests that the rate of 
imprisonment rose "prematurely" in relation to the assertion that the move 
to determinate sentencing "caused" the increases in prison commitment 
rates seen in the post-law years. Figures 1, 2, 3, and 4 present trend 
data on commitment rates for all offenses and robbery and burglary cases 
over both a 25-year period and during the five years in which the imple-
mentation of the DSL is embedded. The lack of extensive post-innovation 
data makes assessment of the impact of the law particularly difficult, and 
there are also some problems with the quality of the data from Santa Clara 
County, but the evidence available does suggest that in all three the 
rate of imprisonment appears to begin to rise in 1976 or earlier, too 
soon to be attributed to the effects of the DSL (which was formally im-
plemented on July 1, ~977). 
A better measure of the effects of the DSL, we believe, examines 
not simply prison commitment rates themselves. The primary mechanism by 
which DSL was supposed to cause an increase in prison commitment rates 
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FIGURE 2: 
PRISON RATES FOR ALL SUPERIOR 
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FIGURE 3: 
PRISON RATES. FOR ROBBERY CASES 
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FIGURE 4: 
PRISON RATES FOR BURGLARY CASES 
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involved the movement of defendants who in the past received long jail terms 
into the category of short son terms so-called "marginal" defen-
dants). Thus, we would expect that the fraction of all those incarcerated 
(jail plus prison) who receive prison terms should increase. If it does 
not (that is, if both jail and prison sentences rise equal , this would 
suggest a generally more punitive sentencing policy, a racheting up of 
probation to jail, jail to prison, rather than the expected effects of the 
DSL on marginal defendants. Figures 5, 6, and 7 examine various rates, 
including the proportion of all those incarcerated who receive prison terms. 
The expected rise does not appear in two of the counties and only weakly 
in San Francisco. 
Finally, we may note that examination of availab e data on defendant 
characteristics and charges does not suggest that there has been substan-
tial change during the pre- and 
law periods in all three counties 
ods. Defendants in post-
records, 
son rates quite 
somewhat more s 
an attribute that would in general lead to increased 
independent of the effects of DSL. There is no evidence, then, for the 
proposition that defendants in the post-law periods have attributes that 
make them less likely to be candidates for prison, thus 
potential impact of the DSL on prison commitment rates. 
the 
\\'hat, then, are we to say about the effects of the OS on son 
commitment rates in our three counties? This is the is on which many 
supporters pinned their hopes, and which worried many others who chose 
to support the legislation for other reasons. Moreover, the distaste which 
many original of the bill are now , has emerged not 
only because of law enforcement supporters' success in raising prison 
terms, but because of the belief that the new law is 1 
prison cormni tment rates. 
to increased 
·R 
7 
! 
'fill 
I .1 
.. ' 
FIGURE 5: 
BERNARDINO 
1974-78 
TRENDS IN INCARCERATION RATES, SAN 
SUPERIOR COURT CONVICTIONS, 
-+-----+--------+---------------L------' 
---~-+--~-_"""'-' .......... _---+ __ __.__;__._;,r:. rl1,~,__~_o0t.,\~~rt=i:nc;:'-.rc~n=atJ:_o_n::j 
..;.. . 4 !-'-'-<'-"' ~ 
' ,J,. ' ' ' 
I' J 
: I I i 
i 
·' I i 
I I 
i ' i I , ! I 1 
I ' ' 
, .i. I 
' ' 
.J' I I M 
,,. I 
I I I I 
' I 
' I I l 
' . 
' I I.: 
' I I ~- J 
' I 
I I I 
' , 
I 
' 
• 1 % 1a 
'-·· • , , 
~ .... 
...--
~ ,.,. 
' 
/ ~.,. 
..... / ~ 
' .. -,. .. ... 
". '•/. • ... I'" 
I i 
--•" "-' :/ I I I' 
'-----I I I I 1,JJi' 
I I : J i i 
I I ~ 
I I I 
\! ( '.' '· i 
-- , ' I II If 
I i I I • I 
. I 
I 
~---~~~~~~~--~-~ 
74 75 76 
Year 
I 
I 
~------·4---_;_ __________ --+-- ---·------f.----
--~--·-----------
77 78 
25 
74 
FIGURE 6: 
FRANCISCO 
1974-78 
TRENDS IN INCARCERATION RATES, SAN 
SUPERIOR COURT CONVICTIONS, 
I I 
I I 
I I I 
' __ :_ 
L . r-
I " 
---
' ~ ' 
-.- ' 
' I ' 
: , 
: I : 
I ,,, 
I 
T 
I 
T 
'. 7o D .. SUll 
... 
d.l.l 
·-
--------+----~---------+---------------+-------~------- ----
75 76 
Year 
26 
77 78 
· a?io.f 1 
FIGURE 7: 
TRENDS IN INCARCERATION RATES, 
SUPERIOR COURT CONVICTIONS, 
SANTA CLARA 
1974-78* 
· r- --------T--------~--------------- ~---- --
----------t------- --- t---------- - : 
---il----~--,------,---.--~-1----------+-----------=-=l===-:::­
l------t--------t-,---,---,---~~--+~---------+------ 1=--=-~ --:=-=: =-~~~~~F~-= =-==~ --=-- -=--: l 
l--r-------o=--~--t-------+-•-+--~--f--.--~_!·1---_-~-+-----------+'i ::p.,-~,~-1--.i:-nc~reeratic;m 
1 
T 
- T 
I 
-+--------------+f-- -
l------·~~~.-4--~---l----~---~~~·~-~=-4------~-~-~-~~~-----~~------­
~---~~~--~~~~--+~~~,~~~~~~~~~~-~-~----~----~----------~--- ---------
t----,-----.-11------:------,--t-~~--,---~---l-----+----J--.--------+----------i----- -- - ··- ------- --r-~-·~~~--~~~~~~~~~~~4---------~~------------+-------------j 
i ' 
' ! I I 
IJ 
to'···· 
' ~ 
~·tt······ flllll"' 
I I 
I l i 
> I 
' i 
' i 
i I 
I I 
I I I I • ' 
I i I : 
I I I I i I 
'-II ' 
• 
... ' 
I ·~ ' .... 
. ..
. -.. 
• 
·" ........ .. 
·' '~ -.. 
!---- r "::J -
I .......... 
I ~ 
I 
~----~---~---4------~--~~----~·.----t---------~---------+---------l ~~~--·---------+-------~-+----~-----+--------4--------~~----------' 
----+-------1-------- -------1--------.---
-------+-------~~-----~---~-------1-----------~------
----+------------1----- -------+----- --- ----
--------+-------------+--- -----------+--------- -- --
78 
* 1977 missing 
28 
Although we do not have the data available to make a statewide 
assessment, and although there are problems with the data for the three 
counties, we believe that the conservative conclusion is that there is 
no persuasive evidence that prison rates have increased as a result of 
implementation of the new law. 
We note that rates began to increase in all three counties prior to 
passage and implementation of the new law, and that an argument that this 
reflects anticipation of the DSL is not convincing. /vluch of the evidence 
cited in support of the view that the law has, as expected, "caused" an 
increase in prison rates seems based upon the fact that rates have gone 
up since the law was implemented. But this conclusion fails to take 
account of trends already at work, and relies too heavily on simple be-
fore and after comparisons. 
We do not want to argue that the evidence available is inconsistent 
with attributing an increase in prison commitment rates to passage of the 
DSL, though the San Bernardino and Santa Clara results seem to point in 
this direction. It may be that courtroom participants who perceived this 
effect were correct. Even if the rates of imprisonment were rising be-
fore the law carne into effect, its implementation may have had some impact 
upon the rate (e.g., made it go up faster than it might have absent passage 
of the law; made it rise more for some crimes than it might have). Rather 
we are simply arguing that the evidence does not permit a clear inference, 
for our counties at least, that the law has had such an effect. 
Finally, we believe that the evidence available is potentially 
supportive of the view that the law is in part better viewed not as a 
"cause" of increased prison rates but rather as itself an "effect" of 
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broader social processes militating towards increased resort to imprison-
ment. Recall that the 25-year trends indicated an upward movement sub-
stantially predating passage of the DSL in two of our counties. Recall 
that in our short-term data, it is not only prison rates that are rising, 
but total incarceration rates as well, suggesting a general trend towards 
increased punitiveness in sentencing. Recall, finally, that the history 
of consideration of the DSL suggests that criticism of the defects of 
indeterminate sentencing by due process liberals and prisoner support 
groups predated support for determinate sentencing by law enforcement 
interests. It was the coming around of law enforcement interests that 
provided the crucial addition to the coalition tha pushed through de-
terminate sentencing. All of these pieces of evidence suggest that 
California was experiencing shifts in opinion--both mass and elite--that 
favored increased resort to imprisonment for several years prior to passage 
and implementation of the DSL. These shifts were already being linked to 
judicial sentencing policy during these years, as the prison as well as 
the jail commitment rates turned up. The passage of the DSL may have 
accelerated this trend via the informal effects process but the evidence 
available to us does not permit firm assertion of such a conclusion. 
Rather, the evidence is simply that the prison rate continued upward 
after passage of the law, in two of our three counties, at least, and that 
this may or may not have been influenced by the effects of the law itself. 
The Rate and Timing of Guilty P eas and the Plea Bargaining Process 
The Superior Courts in all three counties, as in California gen-
erally, relimupon guilty pleas to produce the bulk of their convictions. 
Rates of pleas varied by crime, but ranged from 80-95 percent for all 
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crimes in all three counties. These pleas were typically the product of 
bargains in which the defendant received charge or sentence concessions 
in return for foregoing a trial. Many suggested that a move to determinate 
sentencing might increase the rate of guilty pleas and perhaps cause them 
to be entered somewhat more rapidly. Although the high rate under the 
ISL imposes a ceiling effect--there were so many to begin with that they 
simply couldn't increase too much--several features of determinate sen-
tencing were said to facilitate plea bargaining. Particular attention was 
focused upon "sure" prison cases--those in which it was a relatively fore-
gone conclusion that the defendant would go to prison and the only real 
issue was for how long. Under the ISL, the room for negotiation about 
prison terms is quite limited in scope and often cosmetic. Charge con-
cessions could be made (e.g., dropping two of three counts of armed robbery) 
but the defendant still went up on a five-to-life term and the parole 
authority "saw through" the conviction offense to the initial charges and 
tended to tailor release dates to the "real" offense as opposed to the 
convicted offense. The same was true for concurrent v. consecutive sen-
tences, with the judge able to agree to impose concurrent terms but the 
extraordinarily open-ended quality of the sentencing making such "bargains" 
often more cosmetic than real in terms of constraining the actual time 
to be served by the prisoner. Under the new law, though, with counts 
tied more directly to time served, and concurrent v. consecutive sentencing 
making a precise and measurable difference in time served, the opportuni-
ties for bargaining were greatly enhanced. This means that under the law 
a defendant who is facing a prison term can see much more graphically the 
advantages of a plea bargain (or, conversely, the costs of going to trial 
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and receiving a harsher term). If a defendant's maximum exposure is ten 
years and the deal offered is a six-year term, the defendant sees dir-
ectly what is to be gained by the plea. An offer to drop a three-year 
enhancement for GBI is, likewise, much more tangible than under the ISL. 
As a result, it was suggested before passage of the new law that more 
pleas in prison cases might be produced under the DSL. 
A more subtle and cross-cutting expectation suggested that there 
might in another class of "prison cases" be some dimunition of pleas, at 
least in the short-run. If more marginal defendants were moved from the 
long county jail term to the minimum prison term, and they expected--on 
the basis of their own past experience or jailhouse talk--to be offered a 
jail term, they might initially balk at pleading guilty for a short prison 
term. If the defendant in a burglary case, for example, was offered a 
16-month term instead of a "bullet" (12 months in the county jail) and 
felt that the worst she was likely to do after trial was the middle term 
of 24 months, such defendants might turn down the deal and risk a trial. 
As time went by, of course, the going rate for such defendants would move 
up to a short prison term, and such dashed expectations would diminish. 
Interviews with courtroom participants revealed that most believed 
that the new law had increased the rate at which defendants were pleading 
guilty. They felt that defendants were more willing to dispose of cases 
which resulted in prison terms because they now knew how long they were 
going to go and could see the advantages of the plea more clearly. The 
data available on guilty plea rates, however, suggests a somewhat differ-
ent picture. As with prison rates, time perspective is important. If we 
compare guilty plea rates in the last year before the law went into effect, 
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1976, with those in 1978, there appears to have been a marked increase 
in all three counties. This, presumably, is the effect being detected 
by our respondents. Yet if we examine guilty plea rates in prison cases 
over a five-year period (see figures 8A, 8B, and 8C), we see that in two 
of the three counties 1976 was an abnormally low year for guilty pleas. 
Tr..e increase in 1978 is in fact simply a return to rates of pleas that 
were common in the 1974-75 period. Finally, we examine the more refined 
hypothesis that guilty plea rates in "sure" prison rates will go up while 
those in "marginal" cases may go down. Operationalizing a "sure" prison 
case as one in which a robbery defendant has a prior prison term and a 
"marginal" case as one in which a burglary defendant has no prior record, 
and looking only at defendants who were convicted and received prison 
terms, we do not find the expected trends. 
Thus, -rhe view of many courtroom participants that the new law has 
"caused" an increase in guilty pleas in prison cases does not receive 
strong support in our statistical data. Although participants were correct 
in identifying a rise in the guilty plea rate from the last year under ISL, 
a more extended consideration of the "before" period might have made them 
more cautious about attributing this increase to passage of the new law. 
A similar finding appears when we examine the timing of guilty 
pleas. It has been suggested that the new law may lead defendants to plead 
guilty more quickly because of the certainty about sentenc available under 
DSL: * 
Data . . . indicate an appreciable increase [of] guilty 
pleas at the time of arraignment and a decline in cases 
where a defendant changes from a not guilty to guilty 
*Albert J. Lipson and ~lark A. Peterson, California Justice under 
Determinate Sentencing: A Review and Agenda for Research (Santa Monica, 
Calif.: The Rand Corporation, 1980), pp. 16-17. 
FIGURES 8A, 8B, 8C: 
GUILTY PLEA RATES 
SUPERIOR COURT CONVICTIONS, 1974-78 
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plea after arraignment. Perhaps this reflects the greater 
certainty, under the DSL, of what a case is "worth," so 
that a bargain can be struck at the time of arraignment 
for minor cases or cases involving no serious questions 
about guilt .... Data indicate that many cases are be-
ing disposed of more quickly. Attorneys and judges 
identify those more readily settled cases as those in-
volving the least serious offenses. If so, this suggests 
that the DSL may have accomplished a more desirable use 
of courtroom resources--ready disposition of minor cases, 
permitting more thorough consideration of serious cases. 
In Figure 9, we present aggregate data from the three counties 
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dealing with the timing of entry of guilty pleas in Superior Court. The 
rates at which pleas were entered at an early stage in the proceeding do 
appear higher in all three counties in the post-DSL year than in the years 
just preceding enactment of the legislation. Placing these rates in the 
context of the decade for which data are available, though, somewhat muddies 
the picture. In all three there appears to have been substantial varia-
bility over time, and the quite high rates of guilty pleas experienced in 
1978 are typically matched by similar rates in the late 1960s. This 
suggests that although the DSL may have "caused" a quite substantial jump 
in 1978, some caution must be exercised, particularly in light of the very 
small number of "post" innovation observations. Because the longer trend 
data indicate that there is variability in the rate at which early guilty 
pleas are entered, a substantial number of post-law data points would be 
necessary to exclude the possibility that other factors might explain the 
increase. 
We are also somewhat sceptical about another commonly discussed im-
pact of the DSL--the assertion that it has greatly increased the influence 
of the prosecutor in the disposition process. The move to determinate sen-
tencing has clearly caused a devolution of influence away from the Adult 
FIGURE 9: 
TIMING OF ENTRY OF GUILTY 
PLEAS SUPERIOR COURT, 1968-78* 
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Authority and to courtroom participants. It is frequently suggested that 
in fact the new law has put prosecutors firmly in the driver's seat, making 
them more influential in the courtroom setting than the judge or defense 
attorney. One difficulty with assessing this assertion is simply that of 
operationalizing "influence" in the interaction of judge, prosecutor, 
and defense attorney that occurs in most cases. Moreover, in purely 
doctrinal terms, the DSL does increase the influence of the prosecutor 
vis-a-vis the Adult Authority, for the ability to drop counts and enhance-
ments much more directly affects time served than it did under the ISL. 
Finally, as we shall indicate in the next section, we have some evidence 
that prosecutors in all of the three counties have tended to exercise their 
new-found influence by dropping enhancements less frequently under the DSL 
than they did under the ISL (thus "real" bargains are being offered less 
frequently than the cosmetic ones available under ISL when the Adult 
Authority did the actual term-setting). 
Although it seems unarguable that the DSL has shifted important 
influence over sentencing from Adult Authority to courtroom participants, 
it is not necessarily true that this has given the bulk of influence to 
one of these participants, the DA. In our three counties, interviews 
with courtroom personnel suggest that most do not perceive a substantial 
shift in influence vis-a-vis prosecutor and judge. Moreover, our ob 
servations suggest variation in prosecutor and judge influence in the three 
counties. More specifically, in the county in which under the ISL the judge 
was the dominant participant in plea negotiations--San Francisco--a 
similar pattern appeared to be continuing. The DA in San Francisco 
might refuse to drop a count or an enhancement, but judicial power to stay 
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sentences for either plus a traditional inclination on the part of DAs 
to defer to judges has resulted in continued judicial dominance. 
The two counties which were said to be more prosecutor-dominated 
under the ISL also continue as before. Moreover, to the extent that the 
DSL appears to have changed prosecutor/judge influence, it may have in-
creased the influence of the judge. In Santa Clara, for example, the 
crucial bargaining was and is over the decision about whether to send a 
defendant to prison at all. If the DAdoes not offer a conditional plea, 
the judge typically declines to do so. But if it is clearly a prison 
case, there appears to be a good deal of explicit sentence bargaining, 
in which the judge is an active participant. Such bargaining was much 
less possible under the ISL, for there was little to discuss about sen-
tence length. As a result, it appears to us that in the two prosecutor-
dominated jurisdictions there has been some increase in influence by the 
judge, at least in prison cases. This is largely a result of the peculiar 
feature of California's indeterminate sentence scheme, in which the extra-
ordinarily open-ended nature of the terms made sentence bargaining rela-
tively difficult. The new law makes sentence bargaining much more attrac-
tive in prison cases and enables judges to participate more actively than under 
a system in which choices were restricted to concurrent or consecutive 
time and enhancements, both of which were somewhat ritualistic exercises. 
The DSL does provide the DA with the resources to put the heat on 
the judge and hence to exercise increased influence in the disposition 
process. Under the old law, the judge in a prison case might send a 
defendant to prison for a one-to-life term instead of accepting a prose-
cution demand for two counts carrying five-to-life terms and hardly fear 
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appearing lenient. Under the DSL, with terms tied to counts, a prosecu-
tion staff can routinely demand harsher terms than judges choose to 
impose, and thus make judges appear lenient in more graphic ways than 
were available before. Moreover, the mandatory probation disqualifiers 
do give the DA substantially more leverage. The crucial issue, though, 
is whether prosecution offices choose to exercise their influence. In 
the long run they may, and in some jurisdictions they may already be 
doing so. What our observations suggest though, is a cautionary note: 
when prosecutors were dominant before, they may continue to be dominant 
under the DSL (though even here, the judge may have an opportunity to 
be more active in sentence bargaining in prison cases). Yet where judges 
were dominant before, they may continue to be for the norms of courtroom 
culture are powerful inertial forces. What the future will bring in 
such judge-dominated systems remains to be seen, but our evidence does 
not suggest that the DSL has quickly or inevitably made the prosecutor 
the dominant participant in the disposition process. 
Probation Disqualifiers, Enhancements and Plea Bargaining 
We have noted above that these provisions can be viewed and uti-
lized in a variety of ways. From a formal-legal perspective, the probation 
disqualifiers state the legislative policy that certain types of defendants 
shall receive prison terms. Moreover, the DSL and other recent legisla-
tion moved the status of several disqualifying characteristics from simply 
presumptive (to be operative unless the judge found exceptional circum-
stances) to mandatory (not envisioning the exercise of judicial discretion 
to impose a lesser sentence upon a person whose status as ineligible has 
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been alleged and proved). The enhancements, seen from a similar perspec-
tive, would seem to establish legislative policy that defendants who 
commit certain types of acts (e.g., use a gun, inflict great bodily in-
jury) shall receive punishments beyond those of others who commit similar 
crimes but do not engage in such aggravating behavior. 
From the perspective of courtroom participants, such provisions 
may have quite different meanings. In addition to their role as state-
ments of legislative policy, they clearly provide both issues over which 
compromise may be reached in the plea negotiation process, and may run up 
against existing norms about sentencing practice that have grown up in a 
local court system. Thus, if a "going rate" is approximated by a new 
probation disqualifier, one would expect more ready compliance than if it 
varied from new legislative policy substantially. In the case of conflict 
between going rates and new policies one would expect various adaptive 
strategies to be pursued by court participants, for example dropping of 
allegations of ineligibility in cases in which participants believed that 
the defendant did not merit prison. In the long run, given turnover ln 
criminal court personnel, one might expect that the going rate would grad-
ually shift towards that embodied in legislative policy, but one would not 
expect that such change would occur immediately in the case of provisions 
which called for sentencing decisions widely at variance with on-going 
practice. 
Although in the localities we examined prosecutor offices had de-
clared "full-enforcement" policies, both probation disqualifiers and en-
hancements were relatively rarely alleged and when alleged they were 
commonly dropped. 
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Tables 1 and 2 present data on allegation and disposition of 
selected probation disqualifiers and enhancements for burglary and 
robbery cases in the last year prior to implementation of the DSL and 
the first full year thereafter. The common pattern in both is the rela-
tively light use of both types of provisions. This relatively infre-
quent resort to the provisions is partly the result of the limited scope 
of several, for some simply do not cover very wide groups of defendants. 
For others, this explanation does not seem plausible. For example, 
Correction Department data suggest that in 1979, among all prisoners 
who were committed, the rate of allegation of a past prison term enhance-
ment among those who had in fact served prison t "·~as ~bout 44 percent 
for the state as a whole and ranged from 22 percent to 59 percent to 66 
percent for San Bernardino, San Francisco, and Santa Clara, respectively; 
the numbers who suffered the actually enhanced terms were, of course, 
even lower. 
The evidence available to us from interviews with participants 
suggests that low use of these provisions at the allegation stage did not 
reflect a sophisticated bargaining strategy--for example, threatening to 
file the provision but refraining in return for an early plea agreement. 
Rather, low use apparently reflected largely ignorance and confusion about 
the provisions (e.g., confusion between the enhancement for prior prison 
terms and the probation disqualifier for prior felony convictions), vary-
ing degrees of bureaucratic efficiency in discovering defendant attri-
butes (e.g., the case with which past records could be obtained and 
verified), and simply a slow learning process. 
The disposition of the allegations, on the other hand, suggests 
their integration into the plea negotiation process. In our observations 
Table 1: ALLEGATION AI'JO DISPOSITION OF PROBATION INELIGIBILITY 
CHARACTERISTICS, 1978-79 
Two Prior Designated 
Felonies (1203.08) 
% of robberies in 
which alleged 
% of allegations struck 
% of burglaries in 
which alleged 
% of allegations struck 
Personal Use of Gun 
(1203. 06) 
% of robberies in 
which alleged 
% of allegations struck 
Crimes Against Elderly 
or Disabled Person 
*(1203.09) 
% of robberies in 
which alleged 
% of allegations struck 
San Bernardino 
0 
(173) 
1.0 
(300) 
* 
0 
(232) 
0 
(232) 
SOURCE: Superior Court records. 
*No percentage calculated for N's less than 10. 
San Francisco 
1.4 
(289) 
* 
1.0 
(293) 
* 
10.0 
(289) 
37.9 
(29) 
2.8 
(289) 
* 
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Santa Clara 
6.9 
(232) 
25.0 
( 16) 
l 0. -t 
47.3 
(36) 
22.0 
(232) 
35.3 
(51) 
0 
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Table 2. ALLEGATION A,'JD DISPOSITIO:-.< OF SELECTED E:\HANCEMENTS 
1976, 1978-79 
San Bernardino San Francisco Santa Clara 
1977 78-79 1976 78-79 1976 78-79 
Robbery Cases (97) (173) (264) (289) ( 291) (232) 
Use of Gun (12022.5) 
0, of cases alleged 36.1 31.8 25.8 7! ~ 43.6 30.6 ~a '- I • .) 
0~ allegations struck 60.0 40.0 64.7 22.8 48.9 40.8 0 
Armed \vith Gun (12022) 
% of cases alleged 7.2 26.6 1.9 9.0 15.7 15.5 
0, allegations struck ** 0 58.7 ** 19.2 87.0 3R.9 
Prior Felony/Prison Term 
(667.5) 
% of cases allegec.l 6.2 6.4 27.7 19.0 23.4 10.8 
0, allegations struck ** 45.5 86.3 43.6 83.8 44.0 ·a 
GBI (12022. 7) 
--
n. of cases allegec.l * 4.6 * 4.8 * 4.3 ~0 
0, allegations '0 struck * ** * 64.3 * 70.0 
Burglary Cases (2 21) (300) (260) (293) (350) ( 34 l) 
Prior Felony/Prison 
(667.5) 
% of cases alleged 5.0 5.7 51.9 16.0 24.3 11. () 
a, allegations struck 81.4 23.5 89.6 38.3 94.1 28.9 0 
SOURCE: Court records. 
*Law not in effect. 
**No % computed when N less than 10. 
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of plea sessions, agreements over dropping enhancements were 
common and seemed often not to be the result of changes in the state of 
evidence (the gun turns out to be a toy) but weakness in the state's case, 
a feeling that the defendant was not likely.to receive the enhanced term 
anyway and hence it could be dropped without losing too much, or simply 
hard-nosed bargaining in which the defense attorney persuaded the district 
attorney that the defendant would not plead unless the one or three years 
was saved. Evidence about the use of probation-ineligibility provisions 
was more sparse as a result of the infrequency with which they were 
alleged. Observation of negotiations suggested that dropping of an allega-
tion as a result of a bargain was common. Very tentative evidence, dis-
cussed in the full report, suggest that those provisions furthest from 
going rates--e.g., the prior felony rule in burglary cases--were most 
often the ect of bargains to avoid application of the provision. 
In sum, these provisions were quickly integrated into the bargaining 
process, and became the subject of negotiations designed to settle cases. 
Given the importance of guilty pleas and the workstyle of negotiation 
that characterizes criminal courts, this result is not surprising. In-
deed, a finding consistent with a formal-legal perspective--that such pro-
visions were fully used and legislative policy quickly followed--would 
have been implausible. Provisions like disqualifiers or enhancements 
deal with matters crucial to the operation of courts and affect on-going 
norms that are perceived by participants as being important. Legislative 
changes are by no means irrelevant, and the fact that they may not be 
immediately implemented does not mean that they make no difference. Rather 
their effects are mediated by settled patterns within court systems, by 
45 
the need to settle cases by negotiation and the consequent inclination to 
treat doctrinal changes as not only policies but resources, and by the 
relationship between the legisaltive policy and participant's developed 
norms about what types of outcomes are appropriate. 
The Future of the California DSL 
Speculation about the future is, to be sure, a risky enterprise, 
and made more so by the relative newness of the innovation l'ie have been 
studying. Yet a few possibilities seem worthy of discussion. Our inter-
views with court personnel and with lobbyists and legislative aides 
suggests that the coalition that came together to support the DSL is well 
on the way to dissolution, if it has not been pronounced dead already. 
Due process liberals whos~ported the bill with reservations have found 
one of their fears borne out: once legislators get into the business of 
setting prison terms there is little to stop them from raising them sub-
stantially. Terms have been raised several times already, and many new 
probation disqualifiers have been introduced since the 1976 passage of 
the DSL. Law enforcement interests are likely to be difficult to satisfy. 
Even though increasing numbers of defendants are sentenced to prison for 
increasing amounts of time, there will always be "mistakes" and for some 
prisoners a determinate sentence will never be long "enough." The "mis-
takes" will be comprised of the inevitable number of defendants in any 
given year who will receive probation and then prove by their subsequent 
crimes that society would have been served had they been isolated in 
state prison. The other "mistakes" will not be noticed, for those who 
are locked up in prison but who are not in need of incapacitation cannot, 
by definition, prove that they are not dangerous. The other difficulty 
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that is becoming increasingly apparent to law enforcemtn interests is 
twofold: the terms appear to be too short and they are, by definition, 
determinate. Thus, prisoners will, under the DSL, be let out sometime, 
even those who may be likely to commit crimes again. We envision that the 
short-run solution to these two problems will be that California will 
see in the next several years increasing prison commitment rates and in-
creasing terms for those sent to prison. 
These policy outcomes are not going to please due process liberals, 
though they may feel themselves powerless to resist effectively. Two 
factors may intervene to cause increasing dissatisfactions on the part 
of law enforcement interests as well. First, without the escape valve 
provided by a parole system, longer determinate terms and increased 
commitment rates will produce larger prison populations. Prison con-
struction is an expensive proposition, and the siting of new prisions 
is an especially difficult chore. Thus, political and fiscal problems 
may come to confront those pleased by the increase in prison terms and 
rates. 
Moreover, they may encounter increased resistance in the implemen-
tation of new prison term laws. As terms get longer, the sense of equity 
for judges and prosecutors may be offended. The "informal effects" of 
the DSL--sending marginal offenders to prison for short terms--may prove 
less effective as the terms get longer. Moreover, to the extent that the 
legislature couples increased terms with attempts to reduce judicial 
discretion by probation disqualifiers, further resistance may be en-
countered. Defendants may, moreover, begin to resist the temptation 
to plead guilty to sure and long prison terms. Though the advantages 
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of a plea will be manifest, the length of the term and knowledge that 
they cannot be released before serving a minimum of two-thirds of their 
time may prove sufficiently unpleasant to induce some not to agree to 
plead guilty. Given overcrowded courts, a small increase in the trial 
rate is potentially of great significance. Thus, putting these two to-
gether, we imagine that the implementation process will produce increased 
resistance to legislative attempts to increase prison commitment rates 
and prison terms. 
This resistance will, in the short-run, produce attempts to res-
trict judicial discretion by tighter rules about probation eligibility 
and staying of time for enhancements or counts. The latter legislative 
strategy will turn further influence over to the prosecutor, and both 
because of equity and disposition concerns, many will engage in evasive 
behavior. Moreover, law enforcement interests may increasingly feel 
the fiscal pinch of increased prison populations. 
Eventually, we would surmise, law enforcement interests may come 
to identify the problem as being the determinate sentence law itself. 
Determinancy removes the discretion of the parole board, as well as 
forcing "weak" judges to impose long terms, which they have proved (in 
this scenario at least) less than willing to do. An administrative 
authority to "advise" the legislature about the appropriate terms for 
various crimes is a proposal that has already been advocated. But such 
a version of determinate sentencing may not meet the objections of law 
enforcement interests that some form of indeterminancy is needed for 
prisoners who continue to be dangerous. Reintroduction of some form of 
indeterminate sentencing and a parole board may thus appear a "solution" 
to the problem seen by both camps. Due process liberals, long unhappy 
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with increased prison rates and terms, may welcome the chance to get the 
legislature out of the business of setting prison terms, even though it 
will be at the cost of reintroducing the discretion of the parole board. 
As a result, a new "solution" to the "problem" of sentencing may 
eventually be adopted, and it may look quite like the old ISL (though 
perhaps with somewhat less open-ended terms). 
Clearly, the above is speculative, and it may not turn out to 
characterize policymaking in the future. Yet it does sound suspiciously 
familiar and it is. Sentencing reform has typically involved coalitions 
which supported common solutions to quite different "problems." As a 
result they have been relatively fragile, have broken apart and even-
tually come together again. Whether this will happen again, what form 
it will take, and how long we may have to wait for the next wave of re-
form are all open questions. What seems less open to question is the 
assertion that the difficult policy choices in this area are the products 
of substantial political and ideological conflict and that the evolution 
of policy over the long run is intimately tied to the process by which 
one wave of reform is worked out in local courts and how this process 
becomes tied to evaluation of the reform and efforts at introducing new 
ones. 
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